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Effects of Adult Education Vouchers on the Labor Market: 
Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
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Lifelong learning is often promoted in ageing societies, but little is known about its returns or 
governments’ ability to advance it. This paper evaluates the effects of a large-scale 
randomized field experiment issuing vouchers for adult education in Switzerland. We find no 
significant average effects of voucher-induced adult education on earnings, employment, and 
subsequent education one year after treatment. But effects are heterogeneous: Low- 
education individuals are most likely to profit from adult education, but least likely to use the 
voucher. The findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of existing untargeted voucher 
programs in promoting labor market outcomes through adult education. 
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1. Introduction 
Governments in most countries support lifelong learning by intervening in the adult 
education market, using such mechanisms as tax subsidies, grants, loans, and subsidies to 
providers (OECD, 2004, 2005). Recently, several countries have introduced voucher 
programs to stimulate adult education.
1 Vouchers are intended to increase the demand for 
adult education by reducing its direct cost while at the same time enhancing individuals’ 
ability to exercise choice in the education market. However, little is known about the returns 
to adult education or the effectiveness of government attempts to promote adult learning. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, government intervention in the adult education market can be 
justified if market failures such as liquidity constraints, externalities, or imperfect information 
about private returns lead to suboptimal private investment in adult education (see McCall and 
Smith 2009 for an overview). In such cases, public support for adult education should 
materialize in better labor market outcomes. On the other hand, government investment might 
be less effective in adult education than in early education (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Any 
attempt to quantify the effects of adult education vouchers faces the fundamental problem of 
selection bias, because adults choosing to participate in education are likely to differ from 
adults choosing not to participate in many ways related to labor market success.  
This paper evaluates the labor market effects of a large-scale randomized field experiment 
that provided vouchers for fee-based adult education courses to a representative sample of the 
adult population in Switzerland. In the experiment, which we designed specifically for this 
purpose, a random sample of participants in the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), first 
observed in 2005, was issued a voucher that could be redeemed for adult education courses in 
the first half of 2006. We exploit the exogenous variation generated by random assignment of 
the voucher to identify causal effects of the voucher treatment on earnings, employment 
status, and subsequent participation in adult education in 2007.
2 In our estimation sample of 
more than 10,000 individuals observed from 2005 through 2007, the treatment group consists 
of 1,422 individuals, which we can compare to a control group of 9,099 individuals who did 
not receive the voucher offer. By making use of SLFS respondents and not releasing public 
information on the experiment, our setup ensured that neither treatment nor control group 
were aware of being part of an experiment, precluding Hawthorne effects.  
                                                 
1 In particular, education voucher models are provided by the regional chambers of trade in Austria, the 
Training Check in Belgium, adult education vouchers in several Italian regions, the North Rhine-Westphalian 
and Brandenburg Training Check in Germany, and the Training Check in the canton of Geneva in Switzerland. 
2 The 2006 data of the experiment have been used to analyze pick-up rates and deadweight losses in Messer 
and Wolter (2009). Extension to the 2007 data allows us to evaluate effects on labor market outcomes.   2
The overall voucher effect is determined by the rate at which vouchers are picked up in the 
treatment group and by the effect of voucher-induced adult education on labor market 
success. The latter effect might differ from non-experimental estimates of the effects of adult 
education, which will be biased if selection into adult education is driven by non-ignorable 
unobserved characteristics. In addition, individuals who comply with the voucher assignment 
by picking up the voucher may have non-average returns to adult education. We investigate 
this by comparing OLS estimates of the returns to adult education with IV estimates that use 
voucher receipt as an instrument for adult education. Moreover, we investigate potential 
heterogeneous effects of adult education and voucher receipt on labor market success for 
selected sub-groups of the population. We characterize the complier population in terms of 
these selected characteristics, which is valuable from a policy perspective as it describes the 
population actually affected by a voucher policy. 
We find no statistically significant average effects of voucher-induced adult education on 
earnings and employment probabilities one year after treatment. While limited precision of 
our IV estimates does not allow us to statistically reject the existence of small positive effects, 
our IV point estimates suggest substantially lower returns to voucher-induced adult education 
than those suggested by OLS estimates. Analyzing the potential effect of the voucher on 
subsequent adult education, we can exclude the possibility that the large persistence in adult 
education implied by OLS estimation, even after controlling for past outcomes, is causal. 
Small positive effects of voucher-induced adult education on continuing human capital 
investments cannot be excluded and are in fact suggested by the IV point estimates. 
The results highlight the importance of selection problems when estimating returns to adult 
education. Our results suggest that the incidence of and returns to adult education vary 
significantly between sub-populations. Our estimates of the returns to voucher-induced adult 
education thus likely identify a particular local average treatment effect (LATE). In this 
particular case, however, obtaining an estimate for the LATE parameter of voucher-induced 
adult education is even more relevant from a policy perspective than estimating an average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of adult education, because only the former captures 
what is achievable by a voucher policy. By comparing first-stage coefficients for specific sub-
groups to the overall first-stage coefficient, we can characterize the population of compliers. 
The results indicate that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to comply 
with the voucher assignment, while individuals with low levels of education are less likely to 
comply. A sub-group analysis of labor market effects suggests, however, that individuals with 
vocational training have a relatively high potential to benefit from participation in adult   3
education. This substantial effect heterogeneity is a likely source for the statistical imprecision 
of our IV estimates of the average effect. An adult education voucher might entail significant 
labor market effects when targeted at specific sub-groups. Our findings cast doubt, however, 
on the effectiveness of untargeted voucher programs, as currently devised in many countries, 
to promote labor market outcomes through adult education. The same is likely to apply to the 
tax credit programs for education expenditures for adults as currently implemented in many 
countries, which are effectively untargeted as well.  
While providing the first experimental evidence on labor market effects of an adult 
education voucher program aimed at the full adult population, our study adds to a large, albeit 
mostly non-experimental literature on labor market effects of adult education and training (see 
McCall and Smith 2009 for a review). There are three strands of this literature. The first one 
addresses the labor market returns to private on-the-job training within firms (e.g., Barron, 
Black, and Berger, 1997; Bassanini et al., 2005; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005; Booth and 
Bryan, 2005). It seems fair to say, though, that most of the literature on earnings effects of 
workplace education and training, provided and mostly financed by firms, is far less 
developed in terms of causal identification than the literature on earnings effects of general 
education (see Card, 1999). For example, by restricting the comparison group to individuals 
who were kept out of training by arguably random events, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008) 
show that selection-correction and fixed-effects strategies usually employed in the literature 
are likely to remain subject to substantial selection bias.  
A second strand of existing literature that is not confined to firm-financed education 
estimates labor market effects of formal education for adults. Again based on observational 
data, studies in this literature focus on topics like the effects of upper-secondary or college 
attendance for returning adults (e.g., Leigh and Gill, 1997; Stenberg, 2011; de Luna, Stenberg, 
and Westerlund, 2011), often with a particular focus on displaced workers (e.g., Jacobson, 
LaLonde, and Sullivan, 2005; Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008).  
A third and large strand of literature focuses almost exclusively on the sub-population of 
unemployed people when estimating labor market impacts of public-sector job training as a 
means of active labor market policy. Some of these studies evaluate randomized social 
experiments (for surveys and meta-analyses, see, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; 
Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2010). The vast majority of studies employs elaborate non-
experimental identification techniques to estimate the labor market impacts of public 
programs aimed at the unemployed (see Heinrich et al., 2009 and Lechner and Wunsch, 2009 
for recent examples of evidence from the United States and Europe, respectively). Still, as is   4
duly acknowledged in this literature, it is hard to ultimately rule out selection bias in such 
observational studies, and comparison to experimental evidence has shown that econometric 
evaluations of training programs can lead to very misleading results (see LaLonde, 1986). 
Our study aims to extend the existing literature both methodologically and content-wise. 
Methodologically, we try to overcome remaining issues of selection into adult education by 
devising a randomized field experiment.
3 In terms of content, there is a clear gap in the 
literature regarding public subsidization of self-financed education programs aimed at the 
adult population at large, in contrast to firm-financed adult education and to the population of 
unemployed. Despite the fact that governments in several countries have implemented general 
voucher and tax credit programs for adult education, there is hardly any evidence on the labor 
market effects of such untargeted programs. On public interventions, the literature strongly 
emphasizes active labor market policies with samples restricted to unemployed. On more 
general adult education programs, the literature strongly emphasizes firm-financed education. 
Our study provides first experimental evidence on the effect of government-sponsored self-
financed adult education for a sample representative of the entire population, thereby adding 
to the literature on designing public policies to promote adult education.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next Section describes the large-
scale randomized field experiment designed to offer vouchers for adult education. Section 3 
reports descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy and Section 5 the 
estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The  Experiment 
The voucher experiment was initiated in 2005, when the Swiss government mandated a 
randomized field experiment with vouchers for adult education in order to investigate whether 
general voucher programs could increase adult education and improve labor market outcomes. 
In designing the experimental setup, we took advantage of the fact that the sample population 
of the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) had been raised significantly at the beginning of the 
century, but was scheduled to be reduced in 2006 because of financial constraints. The SLFS 
                                                 
3 While there are few large-scale randomized experiments of public voucher programs in general, an example 
of an exception is the random lottery of housing vouchers in the Moving to Opportunity program (see Kling, 
Liebman, and Katz, 2007). In this regard, our study extends the experimental literature to public voucher 
programs subsidizing adult education. There is also an experimental literature on the effects of vouchers to 
attend private schools (e.g., Rouse, 1998; Peterson et al., 2003) which focuses on lotteries of oversubscribed 
programs to subsidize attendance of private schools, but the extent to which evidence from oversubscribed 
samples generalizes to the total population – or from school children to adult population – is unclear. See 
Greenberg and Shroder (2010) for social experiments conducted in other areas and Harrison and List (2004) for 
an overview of field experiments in economics.    5
is structured according to a rotating panel principle in which the respondents are interviewed 
for five consecutive years. As a result, about one-fifth of the respondent population is 
replaced every year. The financially induced reduction in the sample population in 2006 
yielded the opportunity to select a random sample of 2,437 individuals for the experiment 
who had been interviewed in the 2005 SLFS and would normally have been scheduled to 
continue participating in the next round of interviews but would have been dropped for 
financial reasons if our experiment had not funded their continuing participation.  
The treatment group is matched by a control group of 17,234 individuals who had been 
interviewed by the SLFS in 2005 and were scheduled to be interviewed again in 2006. The 
experimental design enables us to use longitudinal data as well as cross-sectional information, 
among others on prior labor market outcomes and prior participation in adult education. This 
pre-experimental data allow us to check the experimental design and control for pre-
experimental labor market and adult education status. 
The only limitation that we imposed on the sample refers to age. Only individuals aged 20 
to 60 were entitled to receive a voucher. Most under-20s would still be undergoing education 
or training, and a large share of over-60s would be likely to be retired pensioners. There were 
no limitations with respect to employment status, as increasing the skills of non-employed 
individuals may be a goal of the voucher policy. 
The 2,437 randomly selected individuals received a letter from the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office during the first days of January 2006 containing the adult education voucher. 
The letter stated that the voucher was part of a project to promote lifelong learning by the 
Federal Office for Professional Education and Training and that participants of the SLFS were 
particularly well suited to receive this gift. The letter was signed by the General Director of 
the Swiss Federal Statistical Office to eliminate any doubts about the legitimacy of the 
voucher. No public-domain information was generated at any point during the experimental 
period, to ensure that voucher recipients were unaware that the dispensing of the voucher was 
part of an observational study. There were vouchers of three different face values (worth 200, 
750, and 1,500 Swiss francs, respectively – one Swiss franc being roughly equivalent to one 
U.S. dollar), allocated randomly among the treatment group.
4  
Recipients were entitled to use the voucher for an adult education course of their choice. 
The adult education program had to start in July 2006 at the latest. There were no restrictions 
                                                 
4 In addition, half of the treatment group received an accompanying offer for free counseling. In our analyses, 
we did not find any significant differences in estimated effects between those who were offered counseling and 
those who were not.   6
on the content of the adult education module because the intention was to use the choices as 
the basis for designing an efficient adult education voucher system later on. Subsequent 
inspection of course choices reveals that only 10.0 percent of those who picked up the 
voucher used it for course types that might broadly fall within the category of leisure courses. 
The largest category, at 39.7 percent, is courses that are directly job-related, followed by 
foreign language courses at 28.4 percent and IT courses at 21.0 percent. The vast majority of 
vouchers were thus used for adult education courses that might be seen as labor market 
relevant.
5 The average duration of the adult education courses chosen by those who picked up 
the voucher was 42 hours. 
Of the total of 2,437 voucher recipients, 449 redeemed their vouchers, representing a 
redemption rate of 18.4 percent. To redeem the voucher, participants had to send the voucher 
with the course organizer’s invoice to the Federal Office for Professional Education and 
Technology, which in turn paid out the amount to participants. The federal agency conducted 
spot checks to verify that the adult education uptake and invoices were bona-fide. Though 
redemption rates were lower at the beginning and end of the redemption period, the overall 
temporal pattern of redemptions does not suggest any unintentional special effects. Toward 
the end of June, the experimental subjects were surveyed for the SLFS as in previous years.
6  
Like other adult education statistics, the SLFS differentiates between different forms of 
formal and informal adult education, and participation rates vary accordingly. The crucial 
aspect of government funding is its intention to raise opportunities for attending fee-based 
courses. Therefore, the selected SLFS module was the one that asked participants 
subsequently whether they had attended fee-based courses within the past twelve months.  
3. Descriptive  Evidence 
This section provides descriptive statistics on several background characteristics and 
outcome variables. In 2007, the treatment and control groups were surveyed in the SLFS for 
the last time. All individuals of the original sample who were successfully interviewed in 
2006 and 2007 constitute the estimation sample used in this analysis. Tables 1 and 2 report 
                                                 
5 We experimented with estimating effects for the different course categories, but results did not differ 
significantly between categories. Similarly, qualitative results remained similar when dropping the leisure 
courses. Detailed results are available from the authors on request.  
6 To enable later linkage of the latter survey data with the experimental data, the participants were required at 
the end of the survey to say whether they consented to data linkage. This ensured both that the replies to the 
standard questions of the SLFS were not skewed because of linkage with the adult education voucher, while at 
the same time addressing data protection concerns. Fortunately, none of the respondents objected to linkage of 
the SLFS data with the experiment.   7
selected average characteristics separately for the treatment and control groups for the years 
2005 and 2007.
7 The reported numbers of observations show significant panel attrition 
relative to the full sample surveyed in 2005. Among the treatment group, 77.5 percent took 
part in the SLFS at the end of June 2006. Of those participating in 2006, 76.3 percent again 
participated in the SLFS in 2007. Thus, 59 percent of the original treatment group is observed 
in 2007. This extent of panel attrition is standard in the SLFS. For comparison, 55 percent of 
the original control group is observed in 2007.  
Table 1 shows that in most regards, the treatment group drawn randomly from the entire 
SLFS sample does not differ significantly from the control group. There are small, but 
statistically significant differences only for the criteria Swiss, vocational education, and 
university education. The education variables are associated with the nationality variable and 
the treatment and control groups do not differ statistically significantly if nationality is 
controlled for. We do not, however, have additional information why the groups differed with 
respect to the nationality of the survey respondents. What is important for the experiment is 
the fact that there was no possibility of survey respondents to influence the assignment to the 
treatment or control group. 
Due to differences in response patterns, the difference between the treatment and control 
groups in the share of participants reporting to have attended adult education courses within 
the past 12 months in the 2005 survey, prior to the experiment, becomes marginally 
significant in the 2007 sample (Table 2). It seems that people active in adult education also 
have slightly higher response rates in the SLFS. Because the participation rate in adult 
education was higher in the treatment group, the significant difference appears in the 2007 
sample. Due to the response difference, the significance of differences in educational 
characteristics shifts from the vocational to the compulsory and non-academic tertiary 
education categories in 2007. These observable differences caused by panel attrition and the 
initial over-assignment of vouchers to individuals with Swiss nationality emphasize the 
importance of controlling for these characteristics in the empirical analysis below. 
To start with, Table 3 provides mean comparisons of outcome variables between the 
treatment and the control groups without controlling for any additional factors. The treatment 
group is 12.0 percentage points more likely to participate in fee-based adult education in the 
                                                 
7 We use the terms treatment and control groups to refer to the experimental groups of voucher recipients and 
non-voucher recipients, although in the empirical analysis below the treatment effects we are interested in are in 
fact those of voucher-induced participation in self-financed adult education. The pattern of socio-demographic 
characteristics in 2006 (available from the authors on request), where the treatment group contains 1,888 
individuals and the control group 14,193 individuals, is broadly consistent with the 2007 pattern.    8
treatment year 2006.
8 The inclusion of a specific adult education module in the 2006 wave of 
the SLFS allows us to distinguish between self-financed and firm-financed courses in 2006 
(but not in the other years). Voucher recipients are 14.8 percentage points more likely to 
participate in self-financed adult education in 2006, reflecting the first-stage relationship 
between voucher receipt and participation in self-financed adult education that we exploit in 
our IV approach. At the same time, the share of individuals who participated only in firm-
financed adult education in 2006 is 2.8 percentage points lower in the treatment group, 
reflecting the fact that some individuals who without the voucher would have participated 
only in firm-financed training now additionally participate in self-financed courses. In the 
empirical analysis below, we therefore control for firm-financed training.
9  
The bottom part of Table 3 reports group means for our three outcome variables in 2007: 
gross hourly earnings, employment status, and participation in adult education. Gross hourly 
earnings are computed by dividing gross monthly earnings through effective hours worked. 
Employment status is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was employed at the 
time of the survey. There are no significant mean differences in gross hourly earnings and 
employment probabilities in 2007 between the treatment group that was offered the voucher 
and the control group that was not. Figure 1 also provides kernel-density estimates of the 
distribution of gross hourly earnings for the treatment and control groups measured in 2005, 
2006, and 2007. As the reported p-values from two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the 
equality of distributions indicate, we can reject the hypothesis that the wage distributions are 
different at any point. 
Table 3 reveals, however, significant differences in the participation in adult education in 
2007. Those who received a voucher in 2006 are 4.0 percentage points more likely to 
                                                 
8 Note that there is a significant dip in reported participation rates in adult education in 2006 relative to 
previous and successive years that was a one-year event and concerned all groups of survey participants in a 
similar way. According to an official statement of the Federal Office for Statistics (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/ 
portal/de/index/themen/15/07/ind19.informations.190104.html), the dip is likely to reflect a change in the 
reporting behavior of survey respondents caused by a change in the sequencing and wording of questions due to 
the inclusion of the specific adult education module in the 2006 wave of the SLFS, rather than any real dip in 
overall participation in adult education. As these changes in the 2006 questionnaire affected the treatment and 
control groups in the same way, it does not raise concerns for our identification strategy. 
9 We use this definition of the firm training variable – which does not include individuals who have also 
participated in self-financed education – as it ensures that it does not capture indirect effects of the voucher-
induced self-financed education to the extent that the latter might affect the effectiveness of the former. Applying 
an alternative definition of firm training by a dummy indicating participation in at least one firm-financed adult 
education course in 2006 does not affect the qualitative results of our empirical analysis. A comparison of means 
reveals no significant difference between the treatment and control groups in the probability of participating in at 
least one firm-financed adult education course in 2006, which we take as evidence that voucher receipt did not 
lead to significant substitution effects that decrease the incidence of firm training. Also, our results on self-
financed adult education below are qualitatively the same, with even lower point estimates, in specifications that 
do not control for firm training.   9
participate in adult education in 2007, the year after the voucher redemption period. This 
could indicate a positive effect of voucher-induced participation in 2006 on subsequent 
private investments into adult education. However, Table 2 indicated that there were 
marginally significant differences in adult education participation between the treatment and 
control groups already before the experiment. This observation calls for a more rigorous 
analysis of the effects of voucher-induced adult education. 
4. Empirical  Strategy 
We are interested in the effect of the adult education voucher on subsequent labor market 
outcomes. The overall effect of the voucher is determined by the pick-up rate and by the 
effect of adult education on future labor market success. As seen above, voucher receipt 
positively affected immediate participation probabilities in adult education courses (see also 
Messer and Wolter, 2009). Pick-up rates are, however, relatively small. Whether the adult 
education voucher positively affects labor market outcomes, thus, crucially depends on the 
returns to adult education for those individuals who complied with the voucher assignment 
and used the offered voucher. 
We therefore start by analyzing the effect of adult education on future labor market 
success. The following cross-sectional regression model is used to link labor market success 
to participation in adult education and a set of exogenous covariates: 
  t i t i t i t i X education adult y , ,
'
0 , 1 , _ ε α β + + = + , (1) 
where yi,t+1 is the outcome of interest for individual i at time t+1, adult_educationi,t is an 
indicator of (self-financed) adult education in t, Xi,t is a vector of background characteristics 
measured at t, and εi,t is an error term uncorrelated with all right-hand side variables. Note that 
our interest is in the effects of employee-financed adult education, with the help of a voucher. 
Because there is also firm-financed adult education and training, the control vector Xi,t 
includes an indicator for firm-financed adult education. Our key parameter of interest is β, 
which measures the association between participation in self-financed adult education courses 
and labor market success in the subsequent period. However, in standard cross-sectional 
work, β is likely to be a biased estimate of the effect of interest because participation in adult 
education is selective, partly in response to heterogeneity in the returns to adult education. 
Longitudinal data can help to address part of the selectivity bias. We can exploit the panel 
structure of our data and include past outcomes in equation (1). The simplest way to do so   10
would be to rewrite equation (1) in terms of a value-added model with first-differences in the 
outcome of interest as dependent variable. An alternative and less restrictive specification is 
to include past outcomes on the right-hand side of the equation. In this case, the equation of 
interest becomes: 




0 , 1 , _ ε α α α β + + + + = − − + , (2) 
where Xi,t–1 is a vector of labor market controls measured at t–1 and yi,t–1 is the outcome of 
interest measured at t–1. The inclusion of past outcomes in the estimation should eliminate the 
confounding effect of time invariant individual characteristics that affect labor market 
outcomes. Yet, selection into adult education might not only be based on levels of observed or 
unobserved variables. For instance, if selection into self-financed adult education is driven by 
trends in the outcome variable, the estimate for β in equation (2) provides biased estimates for 
the effect of interest. 
The exogenous variation in adult education generated by the random assignment of the 
voucher in our experiment can be exploited to solve the endogeneity of self-financed adult 
education. As vouchers are assigned randomly, we can estimate a two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) model with voucher receipt as instrument. In the just-identified model where 
voucheri,t is the only instrument for the endogenous variable adult_educationi,t, the first-stage 
model relating voucher receipt to participation in adult education is: 






0 , , _ μ π π π γ + + + + = − − t i t i t i t i t i y X X voucher education adult , (3) 
where γ is the first-stage effect of the instrument. The parameter corresponds to the pick-up 
rate of the voucher. The resulting IV estimate,
IV ˆ β , is an unbiased estimate for the average 
effect of self-financed adult education on labor market success for compliers. It identifies the 
local average treatment effect (LATE) for individuals who participate in adult education when 
receiving a voucher, but would not have participated if they had not received the voucher 
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994). 
From a policy perspective, the parameter of interest is ultimately the effect of providing 
adult education vouchers on labor market outcomes. Because of random assignment of the 
vouchers in the field experiment, we can obtain an unbiased estimate of this effect by 
regressing indicators of labor market success on a dummy indicating voucher receipt. The 
reduced-form regression model is given by:   11




0 , 1 , η λ λ λ φ + + + + = − − + , (4) 
The parameter φ  is the parameter of interest. It measures the effect of receiving an adult 
education voucher on the outcome of interest. Not every voucher recipient uses the voucher. 
The parameter therefore identifies an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. Algebraically, it 
corresponds to the LATE estimate of the effect of adult education on labor market success, 
IV ˆ β , scaled down by the pick-up rate estimated by the first-stage coefficientγˆ. 
5. Results 
The discussion of the empirical results builds on the insight that returns to adult education 
are not constant in the population. We start by analyzing average labor market effects in the 
population. We then continue by investigating heterogeneous effects for sub-populations of 
interest. Finally, we characterize the sub-population that complies with the voucher 
assignment based on several background characteristics.  
5.1  Average Labor Market Effect of Adult Education Vouchers 
We investigate the effects defined in Section 4 based on three different labor market 
outcomes: hourly earnings, employment probabilities, and probabilities of subsequent 
participation in adult education. All outcomes are measured in 2007. Given that the voucher 
treatment took place in the first half of 2006, the results should be interpreted as estimates of 
short-run effects. 
5.1.1 Effects on Earnings 
We start by investigating effects on earnings. Earnings conditional on employment is the 
most obvious measure of labor market success. Inspired by the seminal work of Mincer 
(1974), a vast literature on the estimation of causal effects of education on earnings emerged 
(Card, 1999). Yet, the majority of studies focus on returns to schooling. The existing evidence 
on the returns to adult education is still thin. In particular, little evidence exists on the causal 
effect of self-financed adult education. 
Table 4 displays estimation results with log gross hourly earnings in 2007 as dependent 
variable. The first four columns show results of OLS estimations based on equation (1) with 
different sets of covariates. In the first column, earnings are regressed on a dummy indicating 
participation in self-financed adult education in 2006, a dummy indicating participation in 
firm-financed adult education in 2006, a gender dummy, a dummy for Swiss nationality, and a   12
linear and quadratic term in age. The results indicate positive associations of earnings with 
both self-financed and firm-financed adult education. The association between earnings and 
adult education is, however, stronger in the case of firm-financed education. This is in line 
with previous results in the literature suggesting significant positive effects of work-related 
training on earnings (e.g., Bassanini et al., 2005; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). 
Descriptively, participation in self-financed adult education is associated with 6.8 percent 
higher earnings and firm-financed education with 12.4 percent higher earnings in the 
following year. Both adult education coefficients, however, decrease when we additionally 
control for regional variation, family characteristics, and differences in language of the 
interview (column 2), as well as educational controls (column 3). In particular, the inclusion 
of indicators for the highest level of educational attainment reduces the coefficient on self-
financed adult education substantially. Overall, the results reveal the positive association 
between adult education and earnings typically found in the cross-sectional literature, but also 
indicate selective participation in adult education based on observable characteristics. 
Column 4 of Table 4 shows estimates based on equation (2) which additionally controls for 
log gross hourly earnings in 2005 and other job characteristics measured in 2005, before the 
adult education measure. The results reveal that conditioning on past outcomes further 
reduces the estimate of the effect of self-financed adult education. The estimate suggests that 
after conditioning on these factors, participation in self-financed adult education is associated 
with 1.5 percent higher future earnings. The coefficient estimate is 5.3 percentage points 
lower compared to the estimated coefficient in column 1. 
Does this estimate identify a causal effect? The OLS coefficient provides an unbiased 
estimate of the effect of adult education on earnings only if the selection-on-observables 
assumption holds, that is, if the included control variables perfectly determine participation in 
self-financed adult education. On the one hand, this seems reasonable as the specification 
estimated in column 4 of Table 4 includes a large set of covariates relevant for the decision to 
participate in adult education – much richer than commonly available in the literature. In 
particular, the specification includes past outcomes, thereby controlling for heterogeneity 
among individuals typically unobserved in the cross-section. Moreover, our data allow us to 
distinguish self-financed from firm-financed adult education. The results in column 4 show 
that this distinction matters. The coefficient on adult education financed by the employer is 
about twice as large as the coefficient on adult education paid by the individual. This is likely 
to reflect differences in the selection into these two types of adult education. On the other 
hand, selection into adult education might still be influenced by other unobserved factors. In   13
particular, participation in self-financed adult education might be partly driven by expected 
earnings growth (Pischke, 2001). In this case, the estimate would still be biased. 
In our experimental study, the random assignment of voucher offers a source of exogenous 
variation that we can exploit to identify the causal effect of self-financed adult education. 
Voucher receipt is a valid instrument for self-financed adult education: It satisfies the 
exogeneity assumption by construction and is also relevant. 
The estimated first-stage model of the IV approach specified in equation (3) is reported in 
column 5 of Table 4.
10 The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable indicating voucher 
receipt identifies the causal effect of the voucher on participation in adult education in 2006. 
The coefficient of 0.11 corresponds to the pick-up rate of the voucher. It is lower than the 
redemption rate, because of the existence of always-takers. The estimate shows that receiving 
a voucher increases the probability to participate in an adult education course in 2006 by 11 
percentage points. This effect is highly significant. 
The last row of column 5 reports the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue 
statistic (MES) as a test of weak instruments. Using weak instruments not only produces 
estimates with large standard errors, but can also lead to large inconsistencies of the IV 
estimates (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995). The minimum eigenvalue statistic is identical to 
the  F-statistic on excluded instruments because the model contains only one endogenous 
regressor. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002)  suggest that the F-statistic on excluded 
instruments must be large, typically exceeding 10, for 2SLS inference to be reliable when 
there is one endogenous regressor. A value of 61.5 clearly exceeds this threshold. However, 
Monte Carlo simulations show that simply looking at the F-statistic might not be sufficient 
(Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox 1996). A more formal test for weak instruments is provided in 
Stock and Yogo (2005), where critical values for worst-case rejection rates of 5, 10, 20, and 
25 percent for nominal 5 percent Wald tests of the endogenous regressors are provided. In our 
case, the minimum eigenvalue statistic exceeds the critical value at all levels of significance. 
We can, thus, conclude that voucher receipt is not a weak instrument. 
Column 6 of Table 4 shows the corresponding second-stage IV estimate of the effect of 
self-financed adult education on future earnings. The point estimate of -0.01 is small, 
negative, and statistically insignificant. This estimate is well below the estimate of the OLS 
specification. However, the standard error of the IV estimate is large, indicating that our IV 
                                                 
10 We model the first stage as linear despite the binary nature of the outcome variable. Using a linear 
regression for the first-stage estimates generates consistent second-stage estimates even with a dummy 
endogenous variable (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).   14
approach lacks precision. In particular, we cannot statistically reject the existence of effect 
sizes in the magnitude of the OLS coefficients. The lack of precision of the IV estimate results 
from the fact that there are many always-taker, and possibly also from substantial 
heterogeneity in the effect. However, the substantial reduction in the point estimate relative to 
the OLS results might still be economically important. The reduction in the estimated returns 
to adult education may have two reasons: First, OLS results are upward biased because 
individuals with favorable earnings growth predominantly select themselves into self-financed 
adult education, and this selection is not perfectly determined by the control variables 
included in equation (2). Second, considering the LATE interpretation of our IV approach, the 
IV estimate might measure the effect for a particular group of individuals with low returns to 
adult education in terms of future earnings. 
From a policy perspective, we are ultimately interested in the causal effect of the voucher 
on future outcomes. Column 7 of Table 4 shows the estimation based on equation (4). The 
ITT effect is well identified because of the random assignment of the voucher. The point 
estimate is again negative, close to zero, and statistically insignificant. However, the standard 
errors are again somewhat large. We can only reject voucher effects larger than a one percent 
increase in earnings with 90 percent confidence. 
5.1.2 Effects on Employment 
Earnings are not the only meaningful indicator of labor market success. In a rigid labor 
market, effects of adult education might materialize more in terms of higher employment 
probabilities than in terms of increased earnings. Moreover, the earnings results are limited to 
continuously employed individuals. Participation in adult education might be particularly 
beneficial for the non-employed (Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008). 
Table 5 therefore reports results for an indicator for employment in 2007.
11 The structure 
of Table 5 resembles the structure of Table 4 and follows the empirical strategy laid out in 
Section 4. As, in contrast to the earnings equations of Table 4, here we do not condition on 
continuous employment, all estimations are based on the entire estimation sample. 
Consequently, we also do not include job characteristics in 2005 as covariates. 
In the first three columns of Table 5, we estimate employment regressions based on 
equation (1) with different sets of controls. In column 4, we additionally control for 
employment status in 2005. The OLS estimates reveal the same picture as in the case of 
                                                 
11 All estimations are based on linear models despite the binary nature of the outcome variable. We regard 
the OLS results as a linear approximation of the conditional expectation function of interest, as suggested in 
Angrist and Pischke (2009). Probit estimations produce almost identical results for the effects of interest.   15
earnings: Self-financed adult education is positively associated with future employment 
probabilities. However, selection into adult education matters: As we increase the number of 
controls, the estimated associations of employment with both self-financed and firm-financed 
adult education decrease. Again, the effects for firm-financed adult education appear to be 
larger. Results displayed in column 4 indicate that adult education is related to 2.1 percentage-
points higher employment probabilities in 2007 in the case of self finance and to 3.1 
percentage-points higher employment probabilities in the case of firm finance. 
Columns 5 and 6 present results of estimating an IV approach with voucher receipt as 
instrument using 2SLS.
12 Close to the first-stage estimation presented in Table 4, which is 
based on the reduced sample with continuously employed individuals, we find a causal effect 
of the voucher on self-financed adult education in 2006 of 12 percentage points (column 5). 
The IV estimate of the effect of self-financed adult education on employment probabilities in 
2007 is close to zero (at 0.0001) and statistically insignificant (column 6). Standard errors are, 
however, again large and do not allow to reject the OLS estimates. Similar to the 
interpretation of the earnings results, the decrease in the point estimate relative to OLS still 
provides some indication that individuals complying with the voucher assignment might not 
experience any effect of adult education on future employment probabilities. 
Column 7 reports the estimated ITT effect of voucher receipt on future employment 
probabilities. The point estimate is 0.00001 and not statistically significantly different from 
zero. The effect is, however, estimated with relatively low precision. The upper 90-percent 
confidence bound lies at 0.013, which implies that we can reject positive effects exceeding a 
1.3 percentage-point increase in future employment probabilities. 
5.1.3 Effects on Subsequent Adult Education 
So far, the focus has been on short-run effects of adult education. More precisely, we 
investigated the effects of participating in adult education in early 2006 on labor market 
success in 2007. While it seems reasonable to expect that participation in adult education 
courses should have its most imminent effect in the year after participation, naturally human 
capital investments during adulthood might also entail long-term effects. In particular, long-
term effects might exceed the returns in the short run if participation in adult education is 
continuous rather than nonrecurring. Clearly, one hope of policy makers is that “adult 
                                                 
12 Nonlinear second-stage estimates with continuous or multi-valued regressors require a correctly specified 
functional form in order to interpret the estimates easily. We, therefore, apply a 2SLS procedure although the 
dependent variable is binary. Even if the underlying second-stage relationship is nonlinear, 2SLS typically 
captures an average effect of economic interest analogous to the LATE parameter for dummy endogenous 
regressors (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).    16
education begets adult education”. In other words, the voucher might bring individuals into 
adult education, who will subsequently continue to invest in their human capital. This could 
be the case if imperfect information about the returns to adult education leads to a suboptimal 
private investment in adult education. If individuals learn about the true returns by 
participating once, subsequent investment decisions might by positively affected by voucher-
induced participation in 2006. In this case, long-term effects of voucher-induced adult 
education might well exceed effects measured in the short run. 
While we do not have information on labor market outcomes beyond 2007, we can analyze 
effects on the participation in adult education in 2007. Participation in 2007 is not directly 
affected by the voucher, because the voucher was only valid in 2006. Hence, any effect of the 
voucher on future adult education probabilities must be caused by voucher-induced adult 
education in 2006. 
As the results of Table 6 reveal, participation in adult education is indeed highly persistent. 
Estimates in column 1 show that 40 percent of the individuals who participated in self-
financed adult education in 2006 continue to participate in adult education in 2007 (after 
controlling for gender, age, and nationality). Adding further covariates to the model slightly 
reduces the coefficient to 0.36 (column 3). 
Part of the observed correlation between adult education in 2006 and in 2007 might simply 
reflect habit formation or might be caused by adult education modules lasting for more than 
one year. To control for such confounding factors, we add participation in adult education in 
2005 to the model. The results presented in column 4 of Table 6 show that the coefficient on 
adult education in 2006 is further reduced to 0.28. The effect remains, however, large and 
statistically highly significant. 
Does this imply that we can indeed expect voucher-induced adult education to lead to 
subsequent private human capital investments? To answer this question, we instrument self-
financed adult education in 2006 by voucher receipt. Column 6 of Table 6 shows the results of 
this IV estimation. The estimated effect of adult education in 2006 on adult education in 2007 
is 0.13 and statistically insignificant. The standard errors are, however, again large. The 
effect, albeit not statistically significant, might thus still be economically significant. The 
point estimate suggests that the probability of subsequent private investment in adult 
education is raised by 13 percentage points through voucher-induced adult education in 2006. 
This is, however, well below the estimated association between adult education in 2006 and 
subsequent adult education in columns 1 to 4. Despite the somewhat low precision of the IV 
estimate, we can even statistically reject the large effects found in the OLS estimations.   17
Column 7 reports the corresponding reduced-form estimate of receiving a voucher in 2006 
on participation in adult education in 2007. The effect is statistically insignificant with a point 
estimate of 0.015, corresponding to the IV estimate multiplied by the first-stage coefficient. A 
careful interpretation of these results concludes that, while small positive effects of the 
voucher on subsequent private investments in adult education cannot be statistically rejected, 
the effects are certainly not as high as suggested by estimated effects based on models 
controlling for large sets of background characteristics. 
Summing up, the results suggest a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of adult education 
vouchers. OLS estimates with different sets of controls indicate highly heterogeneous effects 
of adult education on labor market success in the population and highly selective participation 
in adult education. The IV estimates foster the concern that returns to voucher-induced adult 
education are close to zero in the short run. Voucher-induced adult education might entail 
small positive effects on subsequent private investments, but these effects are not of the 
magnitude suggested by cross-sectional OLS estimates. 
5.2 Effect  Heterogeneity 
The variation in the estimates of the effect of adult education on labor market success 
based on models with different sets of controls points to the existence of very heterogeneous 
effects of adult education in the population. We begin the analysis of heterogeneous effects by 
estimating ITT effects for vouchers of different face values. Next, we investigate associations 
between adult education and labor market success for selected subsets of the entire population 
suggested in OLS models. We additionally analyze potential variation in the estimated ITT 
effects for these different sub-populations. 
Vouchers with three different face values were randomly rotated within the treatment 
group: 200, 750, and 1,500 Swiss francs, respectively. Table 7 reports estimates of the ITT 
effects separately for the three face values. While the pattern of point estimates in the first 
column is consistent with a lower pick-up rate for vouchers with the low face value, results do 
not differ significantly between the different face values. Similarly, the pattern of point 
estimates in the subsequent columns points to a weak positive association of face values with 
labor market effects, but results are statistically insignificant and close to zero even for the 
vouchers with the highest face value.  
Table 8 reports estimated associations between our three labor market outcomes of interest 
and participation in adult education in 2006 for different sub-populations. The estimates are 
based on estimating equation (2), which includes pre-treatment controls, by OLS. The results   18
reveal that OLS estimates of the effects of adult education on future earnings and employment 
probabilities are stronger for women than for men. Moreover, returns to adult education in 
terms of future earnings are higher for individuals with low education than for individuals 
with high levels of educational attainments. The result is in line with theoretical models 
assuming decreasing private returns to human capital investments. 
Table 9 reports estimated ITT effects for the different sub-populations. The first column 
visualizes differences in first-stage coefficients. Pick-up rates are higher for women than for 
men. The first-stage coefficient also appears to be increasing in the level of educational 
attainment. Estimated returns to voucher receipt in terms of earnings reveal a substantial 
variation between educational groups. While the point estimate is negative for individuals 
holding a non-academic tertiary or a university degree, the estimated returns for individuals 
with vocational training is positive and close to reaching statistical significance at the 10 
percent level. 
In sum, the sub-sample analysis suggests that significant effect heterogeneity is hidden 
behind the average effects analyzed in the previous sub-section. In particular, individuals with 
tertiary degrees appear to have above-average pick-up rates, but below-average returns to 
adult education. By contrast, individuals with vocational training as highest educational 
degree appear to benefit highly from participation in adult education, although vouchers are 
less likely to induce them to participate. 
5.3 Characterizing  Compliers 
From a policy perspective, it is important to understand which group of individuals will 
change their participation decision in response to the adult education vouchers. In the LATE 
framework, these individuals are the compliers. Naturally, because there are always-takers, 
compliers cannot be individually identified. However, it is possible to describe the 
distribution of characteristics of the compliers. This characterization is important for policy 
makers as it shows who will be ultimately affected by voucher programs. This 
characterization might differ from the descriptive statistics presented in Section 3, as the 
group averages presented there refer to the entire treatment group, which includes also the 
always-takers and the never-takers. The latter populations are, however, not of direct interest 
from a policy perspective. 
To characterize compliers based on the subset of Bernoulli-distributed characteristics, we 
can make use of the variation in the first stage across covariate groups, as shown in Angrist 
and Pischke (2009). Let x1i be a characteristic analyzed in the previous sub-section, for   19
example, a dummy indicating university graduates. The relative likelihood of a voucher 
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where zi=1 indicates voucher receipt, D1i denotes participation in adult education in case of 
voucher receipt, and D 0i denotes the counterfactual outcome of participation in adult 
education in case individual i does not receive a voucher. That is, the relative likelihood that a 
complier has x1i =1 is given by the ratio of the first stage for individuals with x1i =1 to the 
overall first stage. 
Average characteristics for compliers are reported in Table 10. The final column shows the 
relative likelihood compliers have the characteristic indicated in each row. It becomes 
apparent that women are more likely to comply with the voucher assignment than men. 
Moreover, individuals with higher educational degrees are also more likely to participate in 
adult education in response to receiving a voucher. 
These findings – together with the evidence on heterogeneous effects – might explain the 
low estimates of average labor market returns of voucher-induced adult education, as it points 
to a highly selective use of the voucher. On the one hand, individuals with higher levels of 
education are more likely to comply with the voucher assignment. Highly educated 
individuals are typically well informed about the returns to education and potentially have 
easier access to firm-financed adult education. Thus, highly educated compliers with the 
voucher assignment might be a selected sub-population of all individuals with tertiary 
education that face low labor market returns to adult education. Moreover, if private returns to 
human capital investments are decreasing in the level of human capital, individuals with 
tertiary education might more generally face low labor market returns to adult education. 
Highly educated individuals might, however, draw direct utility from adult education, which 
does not necessarily materialize in terms of labor market outcomes. This could explain the 
rather high pick-up rates among individuals with tertiary education.  
On the other hand, individuals with less schooling are also less likely to comply with the 
voucher assignment. The evidence on heterogeneous effects suggests, however, that 
individuals with lower levels of educational attainment gain the most from adult education. In 
particular, individuals with vocational training appear to largely benefit from voucher-induced 
adult education, but this group is under-represented in the group of compliers.   20
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we evaluated the effects of a large-scale randomized field experiment that 
issued vouchers for adult education to a treatment group, but not to a randomly devised 
control group, in a large sample representative of the Swiss adult population. Apart from the 
specific literature on public-sector training programs targeted at unemployed individuals as 
part of active labor market policies, this is the first experimental evidence on the returns to 
adult education. By contrast, the extensive existing literature on returns to employer-provided 
adult education and training so far suffers from a lack of randomization. Our experiment 
sheds light on governments’ ability to improve labor market outcomes through untargeted 
voucher programs aimed at expanding adult education.  
We find no significant average labor market effects of the voucher program. In particular, 
using an IV approach that instruments adult education by voucher receipt, we find no 
significant average effects of voucher-induced participation in adult education in the first half 
of 2006 on earnings and employment in 2007. Unfortunately, the IV estimates lack precision, 
so we cannot reject the existence of small average effects. However, all IV point estimates are 
close to zero and well below corresponding OLS estimates of the effects of adult education. 
Investigating voucher effects on subsequent adult education, we exclude the possibility that 
the large persistence in adult education implied by OLS estimation is causal. Small positive 
effects of voucher-induced adult education on subsequent human capital investments cannot 
be ruled out and are in fact suggested by the IV point estimates. 
Estimated OLS effects of adult education decrease significantly when adding covariates – 
and, in particular, lagged dependent variables – to the models. This indicates highly selective 
participation in adult education and highly heterogeneous returns to adult education, which 
may also be a cause for the relatively low statistical precision of our IV estimates of the 
average effect. A sub-group analysis reveals that especially individuals with low levels of 
educational attainment might benefit from participating in adult education. A characterization 
of the complier population shows, however, that predominately individuals with higher levels 
of educational attainment take up the voucher option to participate in adult education. 
These findings are relevant for guiding policies that try to promote adult education by 
voucher programs. The results cast strong doubt that voucher programs that are neither 
targeted at specific groups nor restricted to specific uses are effective in improving labor 
market outcomes. In particular, the potential of voucher programs to generate large positive 
average effects on labor market outcomes is questionable. In addition, the characterization of   21
the group of compliers is helpful in a policy perspective. Only the complying individuals will 
change their participation decision in adult education in response to a voucher program. In the 
case of an untargeted voucher program, the voucher will mainly affect the behavior of highly 
educated individuals. This population might, however, not be the primary target for 
government interventions in the adult education market. Our results suggest that individuals 
with lower levels of educational attainment might benefit more from voucher-induced adult 
education. A specifically designed and targeted voucher program might, therefore, potentially 
generate larger effects on subsequent labor market success. 
Methodologically, targeted program implementation may also help yield higher statistical 
precision of effect estimates in a setting characterized by serious effect heterogeneity. The 
relatively low statistical precision of our IV estimates despite the substantial sample size 
indicates that, due to effect heterogeneity, evaluations need either very large samples, must be 
restricted to more homogenous choice sets for adult education courses, or must be targeted to 
groups with more homogeneous effects in order to yield precise statistical estimates of the 
effects.   22
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University Press. Table 1: Comparison of Means for Socio-demographic Characteristics in 2005
Variable Treatment group Control group Di®erence
Adult education in 2005 .448 .427 .021
Woman .555 .542 .013
Swiss .877 .837 .040***
Age in 2005 41.3 41.6 -.258
Single parent .068 .063 .004
Children of the age < 5 .155 .162 -.007
Compulsory education .143 .156 -.012
Vocational education .504 .470 .034***
University entrance diploma .089 .092 -.003
Non-academic tertiary .162 .150 .011
University .102 .132 -.030***
Not gainfully employed .167 .171 -.005
Number of observations 2,437 17,234
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in
connection with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006. Sample: all observations in 2005.
Table 2: Comparison of Means for Socio-demographic Characteristics in 2007
Variable Treatment group Control group Di®erence
Adult education in 2005 .465 .433 .032 **
Woman .560 .559 .001
Swiss .912 .863 .049 ***
Age in 2007 44.1 44.2 -.080
Married .616 .606 .010
Children of age < 5 .148 .155 -.008
Compulsory education .111 .141 -.030 ***
Vocational education .479 .471 .008
University entrance diploma .094 .083 .011
Non-academic tertiary .203 .161 .042 ***
University .114 .144 -.030 ***
Number of observations 1,422 9,099
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in
connection with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006. Sample: all observations in 2007
with non-missing information on adult education in 2006 (estimation sample).Table 3: Comparison of Means for Outcome Variables
Variable Treatment group Control group Di®erence
Adult education in 2006 .448 .328 .120 ***
(.497) (.469)
,! at least one course self-¯nanced .328 .180 .148 ***
(Self-¯nanced adult education in 2006) (.470) (.384)
,! all courses ¯rm-¯nanced .120 .148 -.028 ***
(Firm training in 2006) (.325) (.355)
Gross hourly earnings in 2007 39.5 39.5 .020
(16.6) (16.4)
Employment probability in 2007 .848 .831 .017
(.359) (.375)
Adult education in 2007 .461 .421 .040 ***
(.499) (.494)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in
connection with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006. Sample: all observations in 2007
with non-missing information on adult education in 2006 (estimation sample). Earnings are measured in
Swiss francs. Standard deviations in parentheses.Table 4: Earnings Estimates
OLS IV Reduced
1st Stage 2nd Stage Form
Self-¯nanced adult .0676*** .0634*** .0248*** .0148** {.0105
education in 2006 (.0097) (.0096) (.0088) (.0069) (.0656)
Voucher in 2006 .1112*** {.0013
(.0142) (.0073)
Firm training .124*** .113*** .086*** .030*** {.237*** .024 .026***
in 2006 (.010) (.009) (.009) (.007) (.013) (.017) (.007)
Wage 2005 .539*** .060*** .540*** .539***
(.011) (.020) (.011) (.011)
Woman {.157*** {.163*** {.128*** {.042*** .068*** {.040*** {.040***
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.013) (.008) (.007)
Swiss .092*** .077*** .054*** .021** .029* .022*** .022***
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.008) (.016) (.009) (.008)
Age .045*** .047*** .040*** .017*** {.004 .017*** .017***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.002)
Age2=103 {.464*** {.482*** {.395*** {.176*** .013 {.175*** {.173***
(.035) (.035) (.032) (.026) (.050) (.026) (.026)
Education No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job char. 2005 No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606 5,606
R-squared .165 .215 .349 .609 .142 .608 .608
MES { { { { 61.47 { {
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable: log gross hourly earnings in 2007. Standard errors in parentheses. Education
controls include indicators for non-academic tertiary degree, vocational education, university entrance
diploma, compulsory education, and university degree. Regional controls include 26 dummies for state of
residence. Family controls include household size and indicators for being married, being divorced, and
the number of children under 5. Job characteristics in 2005 include tenure as well as dummy variables
for self-employment, part-time work, having a side job, 3 ¯rm size categories, and industry based on 12
NOGA categories. MES refers to the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic. Data source:
Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in connection with the voucher
experiment, which was conducted in 2006.Table 5: Employment Estimates
OLS IV Reduced
1st Stage 2nd Stage Form
Self-¯nanced adult .0800*** .0642*** .0499*** .0205*** .0001
education in 2006 (.0090) (.0089) (.0090) (.0072) (.0667)
Voucher in 2006 .120*** .00001
(.0108) (.0080)
Firm training .147*** .133*** .120*** .031*** {.258*** .025 .025***
in 2006 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.008) (.011) (.019) (.008)
Employed in 2005 .593*** .055*** .594*** .594***
(.008) (.010) (.008) (.008)
Woman {.142*** {.140*** {.124*** {.036*** .106*** {.034*** {.034***
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.008) (.009) (.006)
Swiss .052*** .013 {.001 {.006 .048*** {.005 {.005
(.010) (.011) (.011) (.009) (.012) (.010) (.009)
Age .032*** .039*** .036*** .016*** .007** .016*** .016***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Age2=103 {.412*** {.497*** {.464*** {.221*** {.098*** {.223*** {.223***
(.032) (.033) (.033) (.026) (.036) (.027) (.026)
Education No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,521 10,521 10,521 10,521 10,521 10,521 10,521
R-squared .088 .114 .124 .446 .119 .445 .445
MES { { { { 122.52 { {
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable: employment dummy in 2007. Standard errors in parentheses. Education
controls include indicators for non-academic tertiary degree, vocational education, university entrance
diploma, compulsory education, and university degree. Regional controls include 26 dummies for state of
residence. Family controls include household size and indicators for being married, being divorced, and
the number of children under 5. MES refers to the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic.
Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in connection
with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006.Table 6: Estimates for Subsequent Adult Education
OLS IV Reduced
1st Stage 2nd Stage Form
Self-¯nanced adult .397*** .382*** .354*** .284*** .127
education in 2006 (.011) (.011) (.011) (.012) (.108)
Voucher in 2006 .117*** .015
(.011) (.013)
Firm Training .405*** .392*** .369*** .291*** {.304*** .242*** .204***
in 2006 (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.010) (.036) (.013)
Adult education .227*** .203*** .259*** .285***
in 2005 (.009) (.008) (.024) (.009)
Woman {.001 .003 .026*** .022** .088*** .036*** .048***
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.007) (.013) (.009)
Swiss .100*** .068*** .049*** .039*** .038*** .046*** .050***
(.013) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.012) (.015) (.014)
Age .020*** .023*** .021*** .016*** .004 .017*** .017***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Age2=103 {.254*** {.295*** {.268*** {.207*** {.058* {.216*** {.223***
(.041) (.042) (.042) (.041) (.034) (.042) (.042)
Education No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,515 10,515 10,515 10,515 10,515 10,515 10,515
R-squared .167 .178 .194 .237 .173 .224 .193
MES { { { { 123.40 { {
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Dependent variable: adult education in 2007. Standard errors in parentheses. Education controls
include indicators for non-academic tertiary degree, vocational education, university entrance diploma,
compulsory education, and university degree. Regional controls include 26 dummies for state of residence.
Family controls include household size and indicators for being married, being divorced, and the number
of children under 5. MES refers to the Cragg and Donald (1993) minimum eigenvalue statistic. Data
source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in connection with the
voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006.Table 7: ITT Estimates by Face Value of the Voucher
Self-¯nanced Earnings Employed Adult education
adult education in 2007 in 2007 in 2007
in 2006
200 Swiss francs face value .102*** {.011 {.009 {.010
(.019) (.013) (.014) (.022)
750 Swiss francs face value .143*** {.002 {.003 .029
(.018) (.012) (.013) (.021)
1,500 Swiss francs face value .141*** .008 .011 .023
(.018) (.012) (.013) (.021)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: ITT estimates of having received a voucher in 2006 for subgroups of the voucher recipients de¯ned by
the face value of the voucher reported in the ¯rst column. The ¯rst row indicates the dependent variable.
Standard errors in parentheses. The second column reports ¯rst-stage results by subgroups based on the
¯rst-stage speci¯cation used in Table 6. Otherwise, speci¯cations correspond to the speci¯cations presented
in the last column of Tables 4, 5, and 6. Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with
data speci¯cally collected in connection with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006.
Table 8: OLS Estimates of Adult Education E®ects by Subgroups
Earnings Employed Adult education
in 2007 in 2007 in 2007
Men .0139 .0154 .275***
(.010) (.010) (.019)
Women .0161* .0219** .290***
(.010) (.010) (.014)
Compulsory education .0687** .0401 .236***
(.028) (.029) (.034)
Vocational training .0250** .0119 .319***
(.009) (.011) (.017)
University entrance diploma .0283 .0274 .233***
(.032) (.028) (.038)
Non-academic tertiary {.00430 .0170 .257***
(.015) (.012) (.027)
University {.0130 .0295* .255***
(.021) (.016) (.031)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Results report estimates for the e®ect of participating in self-¯nanced adult education in 2006.
The OLS estimates are reported for subgroups of the population de¯ned by the characteristic reported
in the ¯rst column. The ¯rst row indicates the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. All
estimates are based on the speci¯cations reported in the fourth columns of Tables 4, 5, and 6. Data source:
Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in connection with the voucher
experiment, which was conducted in 2006.Table 9: ITT Estimates of Voucher E®ects by Subgroups
Self-¯nanced Earnings Employed Adult education
adult education in 2007 in 2007 in 2007
in 2006
Men .0973*** {.00493 .00413 .0140
(.015) (.009) (.010) (.019)
Women .152*** .00659 {.00594 .0142
(.016) (.011) (.012) (.017)
Compulsory education .0687** {.0246 .00436 .0216
(.025) (.027) (.028) (.033)
Vocational training .115*** .0151 {.000421 .00387
(.015) (.009) (.012) (.019)
University entrance diploma .154*** .00674 {.0160 .00581
(.040) (.032) (.032) (.044)
Non-academic tertiary .176*** {.0266 {.000338 .0220
(.028) (.017) (.014) (.030)
University .145*** {.0186 {.00158 .00655
(.035) (.028) (.021) (.040)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: ITT estimates of having received a voucher in 2006 for subgroups of the population de¯ned by
the characteristic reported in the ¯rst column. The ¯rst row indicates the dependent variable. Standard
errors in parentheses. The second column reports ¯rst-stage results by subgroups based on the ¯rst-stage
speci¯cation used in Table 6. Otherwise, speci¯cations correspond to the speci¯cations presented in the
last column of Tables 4, 5, and 6. Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined with data
speci¯cally collected in connection with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006.Table 10: Characterizing Compliers
Variable
P[x1i = 1] P[x1i = 1jD1i > D0i]
P[x1i = 1jD1i > D0i]=
P[x1i = 1]
Woman 0.56 0.66 1.18
Compulsory education 0.14 0.07 0.54
Vocational education 0.47 0.42 0.89
University entrance diploma 0.08 0.10 1.17
Non-academic tertiary 0.17 0.23 1.37
University 0.14 0.16 1.14
Age 20 to 29 0.12 0.06 0.54
Age 30 to 39 0.26 0.19 0.76
Age 40 to 49 0.29 0.37 1.30
Age 50 to 60 0.28 0.32 1.15
Employed in 2005 0.82 0.79 0.96
Adult education in 2005 0.44 0.47 1.08
Note: The table reports an analysis of complier characteristics. The ratio in the last column shows the
relative likelihood compliers have the characteristic indicated in each row. Data source: Swiss Labor Force
Survey (SLFS) combined with data speci¯cally collected in connection with the voucher experiment, which
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p−value: .57
Note: Kernel density estimates based on 2007 estimation sample. p-values refer to two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions. Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) combined
with data speci¯cally collected in connection with the voucher experiment, which was conducted in 2006.